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REINFORCING GUARDIANSHIP REGIMES THROUGH ASSISTED DECISION-MAKING – A 
SCOTTISH PERSPECTIVE 
SHIH-NING THEN, HILARY PATRICK AND NICOLA SMITH*  
INTRODUCTION 
Guardianship laws which provide legal mechanisms for decision-making on behalf of adults 
with limited or impaired capacity to make decisions have become a feature of most 
Western jurisdictions.1  In the UK, the Adults with Incapacity (Scotland) Act 2000 and the 
English and Welsh Mental Capacity Act 2005 have established a comprehensive framework 
for authorising medical, financial and welfare decisions to be taken on behalf of adults 
who are unable to take any or all such decisions themselves. 
One feature of guardianship regimes has been their tendency to evolve over time. 
Legal reforms have been instigated by the changes in philosophical views about how 
society should engage with adults with a decision-making impairment and also modern 
views about the role human rights play in guardianships regimes.  The latest ideas in 
guardianship regimes around the Western world centre on the possibility of legal 
recognition of the concept of assisted decision-making.2  
This concept differs from traditional guardianship decision-making mechanisms. 
Instead of the norm where legislation provides legal authority for others to make decisions 
on behalf of adults lacking capacity, the concept of assisted decision-making recognises 
that a person’s capacity may be maintained or retained for longer if he or she receives 
assistance or support with decision-making.  Such assistance or support might include 
identifying how others can help to access information on behalf of the adult, provide 
information or explanations of information in a manner which the adult can comprehend; 
and it may extend to discussions with the adult to help decisions to be made, as well as 
acting on the adult’s behalf to communicate and implement the adult’s decision to others.3   
Assisted decision making recognises that the concepts of capacity and incapacity 
are not all or nothing, but rather that a grey zone exists where capacity and incapacity 
may merge over time for an individual.  Some countries are taking steps to implement or 
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1  We use the term ‘guardianship laws’ and ‘guardianship regime’ to encompass the full range of legal 
mechanisms developed to deal with when adults may suffer from some decision-making impairment.  
2  See generally, R M Gordon, “The emergence of assisted (supported) decision-making in the Canadian law of 
adult guardianship and substitute decision-making” (2000) 23(1) Int’l J.L. & Psychiatry 61; D Surtees, “The 
evolution of co-decision-making in Saskatchewan” (2010) 73 Sask.L.Rev. 75; S N Then “Evolution and innovation 
in guardianship laws: assisted decision-making” (2013) Syd LR 133.  
3 N Devi, et al, “Moving towards substituted or supported decision-making? Article 12 of the Convention on the 
Rights of Persons with Disabilities” (2011) 5 ALTER, European Journal of Disability Research 249, 254–5. See 
also, L Salzman, “Rethinking guardianship (again): substituted decision-making as a violation of the integration 
mandate of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act” (2010) 81 U.Colo.L.Rev. 157, 180. 
  
have already embraced legislation that provides for this third form of decision-making. 
These steps are consistent with recognising the human rights of adults with decision-
making impairments, as recognised at an international level with the UN Convention of the 
Rights of People with Disabilities (CRPD). 4 
This paper examines the relevance of legal reforms in other jurisdictions’ 
guardianship legislation – where assisted decision-making mechanisms have been 
introduced – to the legal position in Scotland.  It seeks to consider the extent to which 
assisted-decision making already exists in Scotland in the context of recent legislation and 
suggests areas where further reform might be considered.  
Part 1 briefly considers the philosophical drivers for adopting assisted decision-making 
mechanisms into legislation and Part 2 goes on to describe the legislative means adopted 
by the various countries around the world which currently incorporate and recognise the 
concept of assisted decision-making.  This provides the contextual basis upon which the 
rest of the paper, which focuses on the position in Scotland, will rest.  Part 3 considers 
how far the notion of assisted decision-making is already legally recognised in Scotland, 
through both the legal recognition of independent advocacy and under the Self Directed 
Support (Scotland) Act 2013.  It is doubtful whether recent changes in Scots law were 
adopted to further the notion of assisted decision-making, but they do represent 
interesting and important developments.  
A. PART 1: ASSISTED DECISION-MAKING IN THE CONTEXT OF GUARDIANSHIP REGIMES 
To understand the underlying rationale for assisted decision-making, it is necessary to 
briefly consider the context in which guardianship laws have developed over time.   
Historically, respect for the medical profession led to an acceptance of the 
‘medical model’ of disability that viewed all those with impairments as sick and in need of 
care.5 This led to the establishment and maintenance of institutions – often called asylums 
– to house adults with some decision-making impairment on a long term basis.6   This 
trend of State-institutionalisation persisted for decades during which the need for 
decisions to be made on behalf of institutionalised adults was very confined.7 Personal 
decision-making within institutions was limited; doctors and carers often formally or 
informally made decisions on residents’ behalf.8   
Philosophical shifts in the way society viewed such adults lead to eventual ‘de-
institutionalisation’. The movement of those formerly housed in institutions into society 
                                                 
4 Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (‘CRPD’) opened for signature 30 March 2007, 2515 
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6 T Carney & P Singer, Ethical and Legal Issues in Guardianship Options for Intellectually Disadvantaged 
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7 Law Reform Commission (United Kingdom), Mental Incapacity Report No 231 (1995) para 2.32.  
8 T Carney & P Singer, Ethical and Legal Issues in Guardianship (n 6) 12.  
  
created the impetus for guardianship laws to be put in place for decisions made on behalf 
of adults with decision-making impairments to be formally recognised.9  
Underpinning these changes was the emerging recognition that all individuals were 
deserving of respect and ought to have their rights to autonomy recognised to the greatest 
extent possible. As such, the ‘medical model’ began to be questioned and increased 
recognition for the ‘social model’ of disability began.  This model was based on the 
understanding that the limitations experienced by those with disabilities were often 
socially or politically constructed (rather than as an direct consequence of their disability) 
and as such could be modified through political or social means.10   
Alongside this recognition of ‘disability rights’ was the development of a greater 
understanding and emphasis on human rights.11  As such the social aims which had been 
predominantly concerned with ‘protecting’ such vulnerable adults also came to recognise 
the twin aim of needing to ‘empower’ those same individuals. It came to be realised – 
through media, academia and politics – that those individuals had largely had their rights 
ignored.  
An additionally driver of the guardianship agenda was the ageing populace in 
Western countries who demanded legal change.12  This group was instrumental in having 
advance planning documents (such as continuing and welfare powers of attorneys and 
advance health directives) incorporated into guardianship law regimes.13 
Reform of inadequate existing legal mechanisms also occurred. In the past court 
procedures were rarely utilised and the results of such proceedings were usually inflexible 
with no option but to appoint plenary or ‘full’ substitute decision-makers.14 As one of the 
authors has noted previously, ‘[t]his “all or nothing’ approach completely deprived the 
person subject to the proceedings of any autonomy to make their own decisions – 
regardless of their level of incapacity’.15 
These social forces have, since the 1970’s, brought about legal reform in many Western 
nations that challenges the outdated system for regulating the affairs of people with 
impaired capacity. 
                                                 
9 In addition, it was recognised that medical professionals and others became more risk averse and were 
concerned about their liability where no formal substitute decision-maker was recognised: R M Gordon & S N 
Verdun-Jones, Adult Guardianship Law in Canada (n 6) 1-15.  
10 L Clements & J Read, “Introduction: life, disability and the pursuit of human rights”, in L Clements and J 
Read (eds), Disabled people and the right to life: the protection and violation of disabled people's most basic 
human rights (2008) 1-3. See also A Lawson, “The United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities: new era or false dawn?” (2007) 34 Syracuse J of International Law & Commerce 563, 571–574. 
11 R Kayess & P French (n 5) at 1, 14.  
12 Law Reform Commission (United Kingdom), Mental Incapacity Report No 231 (1995) para 2.35; G H Zimny & 
GT Grossberg, “Guardianship of the elderly”, in G H Zimny & GT Grossberg (eds), Guardianship of the elderly 
(1998) 3-4; J K Mason & G T Laurie, Mason and McCall Smith's law and medical ethics, 8th edn, (2010) para 
12.02. 
13 Then (n 2) at 133,138-9. 
14 M B Kapp, “Legal basis of guardianship”, in G H Zimny & G T Grossberg, Guardianship of the elderly (n 12) 
16, 21; R M Gordon & S N Verdun-Jones, Adult guardianship law in Canada (n 6) para 1-20–1-21.  
15 Then (n 2) at 133, 139. 
  
1. THE DEVELOPMENT OF GUARDIANSHIP LEGISLATION IN SCOTLAND 
The reform of Scotland’s incapacity laws is relatively recent.  In Scotland there were 
several drivers for such change. The development of community care led to the closure of 
long term hospitals, particularly for those with learning disabilities, and their replacement 
with housing and support being provided in the community. The influential "Same as You" 
report16 identified the need to provide a model of citizenship for people with learning 
disabilities which recognised rights and responsibilities.17  
Linked to this was a growing interest in the rights of individuals whose capacity 
might be impaired, both from these individuals themselves (with the development of 
collective advocacy groups) 18   and from concerned and campaigning individuals and 
organisations.19 
The increased interest in the human rights of people with disabilities and the rise in 
confidence of the disability movement had already resulted in disability discrimination 
legislation. In 1990 the Americans with Disabilities Act was passed. This was followed in 
1995 by the UK's Disability Discrimination Act,20  which, however flawed, highlighted the 
way in which people with mental impairments were being unfairly regarded by the law.21  
This legislation, with its emphasis on equality and non-discrimination, underlined the 
need to reconsider the way Scots law attempted to address the needs of adults with 
decision-making impairments. In 2000, the new Scottish Parliament took the opportunity 
to embrace an issue of social reform and the Adults with Incapacity (Scotland) Act was 
passed as the Parliament’s first major piece of legislation .  
2. FEATURES OF GUARDIANSHIP LEGISLATION                  
Some common features of modern incapacity legislation are present in most Western 
jurisdictions, including in the Adults with Incapacity (Scotland) Act 2000.  These include: 
• Capacity as a threshold concept: In the vast majority of modern guardianship 
regimes the concept of capacity acts as a threshold concept and determines which adults 
come within the ambit of, and become subject to, guardianship legislation. In Scotland, 
the definition of ‘incapable’ and ‘incapacity’ is outlined in section 1(6) of the Act.22  Adults 
without capacity may become subject to guardianship regimes, and legislation recognises 
that others may be able to make decisions on behalf of them. Modern legislation generally 
                                                 
16  The Scottish Government, "The same as you? A review of services for people with learning disabilities” 
(2000) available at http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Resource/Doc/1095/0001661.pdf. 
17 R Griffiths, "Community care: agenda for action" (1988) Department of Health and Social Security.  
18 See for example, People First, Scottish Users' Network, Highland Users' Forum.  
19 The Law Society of Scotland, Mental Welfare Commission for Scotland, Alzheimers Scotland, the Scottish 
Association for Mental Health and Enable, which later joined with many others in the Alliance for the 
Promotion of the Incapable Adults Bill. 
20 Now replaced by the Equalities Act 2010.  
21 H Patrick “The Disability Discrimination Act: failing people with mental health problems?”  SCOLAG Journal, 
No.296, June 2002,101-104, No.296, July 2002, 122-123,133.  
22 Adults with Incapacity (Scotland) Act 2000 s 1(6) states, ‘“incapable” means incapable of–(a) acting; or (b) 
making decisions; or (c) communicating decisions; or (d) understanding decisions; or (e) retaining the memory 
of decisions, as mentioned in any provision of this Act, by reason of mental disorder or of inability to 
communicate because of physical disability; but a person shall not fall within this definition by reason only of 
a lack or deficiency in a faculty of communication if that lack or deficiency can be made good by human or 
mechanical aid…; and “incapacity”–shall be construed accordingly.  
  
uses a functional test of incapacity, and rejects the approach of depriving an adult of 
powers in an area where he or she remains able to take decisions.23  
• The ability for competent adults to appoint substitute decision-makers or make 
clear  their wishes for a time when they lose capacity:  competent adults are generally 
given the ability under incapacity legislation to appoint a person (usually known as an 
attorney24) to make some or all financial, welfare and health decisions for them should 
they lose capacity. Some other jurisdictions also allow adults to execute legally recognised 
advance directives that give directions as to future health care at a time when they may 
lose capacity.25 
• The ability for courts or tribunals to appoint substitute decision-makers if an 
adult lacks the ability to make decisions for themselves: Where an adult is found to lack 
capacity, guardianship legislation provides for courts or tribunals to appoint a substitute 
decision-maker (e.g. a guardian or administrator) on behalf of the adult where there is a 
need to do so. 26   Importantly, to overcome the criticism noted above regarding the 
appointment of plenary substitute decision-makers, most modern guardianship regimes 
allow and, indeed require, courts and tribunals to appoint substitute decision-makers only 
in the areas of decision-making where there is a need (i.e. the specific areas that the 
adult lacks decision-making capacity).  Most jurisdictions now provide for appointment of 
partial guardians or administrators. 
• The Scottish legislation envisaged that guardians would only have such limited 
powers as were demonstrated to be necessary and this would only happen in line with the 
principles of the legislation.  However, in the experience of two of the authors, in 
practice, guardianship orders in Scotland are often granted containing plenary welfare and 
financial decision making powers.  The plenary power is usually followed by a list of more 
specific powers giving the appearance of a partial and more person centred order. 
• A statutory principled based approach: The vast majority of guardianship regimes 
have legislation which recognises a number of key principles to guide decision-makers 
(including appointed attorneys, guardians, administrators, courts and tribunals) acting on 
behalf of adults lacking capacity.  These principles encapsulate notions of recognising 
vulnerable adults’ human rights but also the need to protect those adults.  Common 
principles, while not uniformly described, tend to include: the presumption of capacity, 
adopting an approach which is the least restrictive option, respecting an adult’s autonomy 
and acting in accordance with the adult’s best interests (or, in Scotland, one which 
benefits the adult).27  The majority of these are reflected in section 1 of the Adults with 
Incapacity (Scotland) Act 2000.  
• A balance (or tension) between the need to protect vulnerable adults and 
recognition of their autonomy:  Guardianship legislation often exhibits a tension between 
principles that suggest the need to protect vulnerable adults (including from their own 
actions) and the need to respect their autonomy.  This is most often seen where the 
principles of acting in the adult' ‘best interests’ or ‘benefit’ and ‘respecting the adult’s 
                                                 
23 For a human rights case that discusses this see: Shtukaturov v Russia (European Court of Human Rights, First 
Section, Application No. 44009/05, 27 March 2008) at para 90-96.  
24 Adults with Incapacity (Scotland) Act 2000 s 16.  
25 See, for example, Mental Capacity Act 2005 s 24-26.  
26 In Scotland this is provided for under Adults with Incapacity (Scotland) Act 2000 s 57.  
27 Adults with Incapacity (Scotland) Act 2000 s 1(2).  
  
autonomy’ co-exist with no mechanism for which should be given priority in what 
circumstances.   
 As mentioned above, the move towards formally recognising assisted decision-
making mechanisms in legislation has been driven in part by the CRPD. In particular, 
article 12 of that Convention states that State Parties: 
‘shall recognise that persons with disabilities enjoy legal capacity on an equal 
basis with other in all aspects of life… [and] shall take appropriate measures to 
provide access by persons with disabilities to the support they may require in 
exercising their legal capacity.’ 
While this article does not, perhaps, adequately consider the situation of persons 
whose impairments reduce their actual capacity to act, its existence has proved to be a 
driver for the legal recognition of assisted decision-making mechanisms.28 Article 12 has 
also led to it being more commonly understood that just because a person may have 
difficulty in making decisions, this is not the same thing as being legally unable to take 
decisions.29  
B. PART 2: ASSISTED DECISION-MAKING IN GUARDIANSHIP REGIMES 
Legally recognised assisted decision-making models are innovative, due to the fact that 
they do not operate on the usual threshold basis of an adult having a legal incapacity.  
Indeed, what these models aim to achieve is to maintain decision-making capacity in an 
adult for as long as possible, and to provide legal means to assist in this.  As such, they are 
a mechanism for promoting, for as long as possible, the autonomy of adults who may have 
reduced, or reducing, capacity.  
Such mechanisms could complement existing guardianship regimes and could add 
to current mechanisms (including powers of attorney and advance health directives) that 
allow adults to plan ahead and potentially give courts more flexible options for adults.30 
While the ways in which a person may be assisted to retain and exercise his or her 
decision-making capacity may have been acknowledged and implemented in practice by 
some carers and substitute decision-makers (although perhaps not by all), the movement 
towards making such assistance legally recognised is a new development. Some may ask 
why or whether such legislative recognition is in fact necessary, given that ‘good practice’ 
will already recognise the sliding scale of decision-making abilities and the need for it to 
be supported in practice.  
However, as noted by the Victorian Law Reform Commission in Australia, without 
formal recognition of the supporter's role, the ability to access information and support an 
adult in making decisions may be limited. Without formal authority, those helping adults 
may encounter obstacles in attempting to access certain information on behalf of the 
                                                 
28 United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, et al, “From exclusion to equality: realizing the rights 
of persons with disabilities: handbook for parliamentarians on the Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities and its Optional Protocol” (No 17, 2007) 89–91; A Dhanda, “Legal capacity in the disability rights 
convention: stranglehold of the past or lodestar for the future?” (2007) 34 Syracuse J of International Law and 
Commerce 429. 
29 R & B Fogarty, “The rights and dignity of persons with disabilities – a United Nations convention” (2007) 32 
Alt LJ 22, 25.  
30 Then (n 2) at 133,141. 
  
adult. If this is the case, the argument in favour of some legal recognition of the concept 
may be justified. As noted by the Commission, ‘[f]ormalising the relationship would also 
clarify the supporter’s role to third parties who interact with the person and their 
supporter’.31  
In this Part we identify and describe the three main ways in which assisted decision-
making has been formally recognised in guardianship legal regimes around the world. We 
recognise that the mechanisms in some countries may overlap between these categories. 
1. CURRENT MODELS OF ASSISTED DECISION-MAKING 
a) Model 1: Recognition of the need for assisted decision-making in practice 
Some jurisdictions have legislation which implicitly acknowledges the practice of assisted 
decision-making, without introducing measures to formally recognise those providing the 
assistance. For example, the Mental Capacity Act 2005 (England & Wales) states as one of 
its general principles that, ‘A person is not to be treated as unable to make a decision 
unless all practicable steps to help him to do so have been taken without success’.32 
Other jurisdictions utilise general principles such as ‘the least restrictive approach’, 
‘respect for autonomy’ and ‘the presumption of capacity’. Each of these could be regarded 
as implicitly suggesting that a person should be given the assistance necessary to make 
decisions for themselves. This is generally the approach that Scotland has taken. Section 1 
of the Adults with Incapacity (Scotland) Act 2000 relevantly provides in its general 
principles that the ‘least restrictive option’ must be taken, as well as including the 
following statements which would seem to implicitly support the notion of assisted 
decision-making: 
There shall be no intervention in the affairs of an adult unless the person 
responsible for authorising or effecting the intervention is satisfied that the 
intervention will benefit the adult and that such benefit cannot reasonably be 
achieved without the intervention. 
Similarly, in subsection (5) it is provided that 'Any guardian, continuing attorney, 
welfare attorney or manager…in relation to an adult shall, in so far as it is reasonable and 
practicable to do so, encourage the adult to exercise whatever skills he has concerning his 
property, financial affairs or personal welfare, as the case may be, and to develop new 
such skills.’ (emphasis added)  Although a person may be found to lack capacity in certain 
areas, he or she should continue to receive assistance to enable him or her to make such 
decisions as he or she can. 
It is interesting that the Scottish legislation does not, however, explicitly oblige those 
intervening in an adult’s affairs to ensure that all reasonable efforts have been made to 
maximise the person's residual capacity before a decision is taken that the adult lacks 
capacity. As discussed below, other jurisdictions have implemented legal schemes which 
explicitly recognise the importance of assisting an adult who has a decision-making 
impairment.  
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b) Model 2: ‘Supported’ decision-making  
Under a supported decision-making model it is presumed that an adult has the ability to 
make decisions, but requires help in executing them.33 
Some jurisdictions have enacted regimes giving legal recognition to the role of the 
‘supporter’.34 For example, this type of legally recognised supporter role exists in the 
Canadian Province of Alberta and the Territory of Yukon. The Republic of Ireland currently 
has a Bill which, if enacted, will provide for a similar regime35 and its implementation has 
also been recommended by the Victorian Law Reform Commission for the Australian State 
of Victoria.36 
Generally this model relies on an agreement comparable to a welfare power of 
attorney.  This form of supported decision-making agreement is an alternative, or 
additional, form of advance planning document utilised by an adult when he or she has 
capacity.  As such it is usually a private and adult controlled agreement entered into with 
a person of the adult’s choosing.37 The purpose of the agreement is to give formal legal 
recognition to the person appointed as a ‘supporter’ so that external parties recognise the 
supporter’s role in assisting the adult to make decisions.   
Unsurprisingly, under this model, a decision made with the supporter’s assistance 
remains the decision of the adult.38 Generally there is no requirement for the supporter to 
be involved in decisions made by the adult.39  
The legislation gives those in the supporter’s role the legal authority to access and 
obtain the information on behalf of the adult which will be needed to assist the adult 
make decisions.40  As these models are generally contained within guardianship legislation, 
the guiding principles that apply to substitute decision makers (discussed above at A.2.) 
are also relevant to supporters. In addition, some jurisdictions impose specific duties on 
supporters, such as the need to maintain specific records.41  Another common feature of 
such models is that the supporter who acts in good faith is not liable for things done while 
acting in their role.42  
                                                 
33 K Wilber & S Reynolds, “Rethinking alternatives to guardianship” (1995) 35 The Gerontologist 248-249.  
34 See generally Then (n 2) at 133, 149-51.  
35 See Assisted Decision-Making (Capacity) Bill 2013 (Ireland) available at 
http://www.justice.ie/en/JELR/Assisted%20Decision-
making%20(Capacity)%20Bill%202013.pdf/Files/Assisted%20Decision-making%20(Capacity)%20Bill%202013.pdf  
36 Victorian Law Reform Commission (Australia), Guardianship Final Report, Report No 24 (2012) ch 8.  
37 See, for example, Adult Guardianship and Trusteeship Act, A 2008, c A-4.2, s 4; Decision-making, Support 
and Protection to Adults Act, Y 2003, c 21, s 6, 9.  
38 See, for example, Adult Guardianship and Trusteeship Act, A 2008, c A-4.2,  s 6(1); Decision-making, 
Support and Protection to Adults Act, Y 2003, c 21, s 11.  
39 This can be compared to, Decision-making, Support and Protection to Adults Act, Y 2003, c 21, s 12.  
40 See, for example, Adult Guardianship and Trusteeship Act A 2008, c A-4.2, s 9; Decision-making, Support 
and Protection to Adults Act, Y 2003, c 21,s 10.  In Yukon the obligation extends to endeavouring to ensure the 
adult’s decision is implemented: s 5(1)(e).  
41 Adult Guardianship and Trusteeship (Ministerial) Regulation, Alta Reg 224/2009 s 4.  
42 See, for example, Decision-making, Support and Protection to Adults Act, Y 2003, c 21, s 13(1); Adult 
Guardianship and Trusteeship Act, A 2008, c A-4.2, s 10. A similar provision for attorneys and guardians in 
contained in the Adults with Incapacity (Scotland) Act 2000 s 82.  
  
c)  Model 3:  ‘Co-decision-making’  
The third, and most radical, model incorporates assisted decision-making in a new legal 
form known as ‘co-decision-making’. This model creates a new legal concept of ‘joint’ 
decision-making between an adult with some decision-making impairment and an 
appointed co-decision-maker. The adult will generally only be considered to have capacity 
to make decisions in the relevant area when that decision is made jointly with the 
appointed co-decision-maker.43  
Again, the Canadian jurisdictions (in particular Saskatchewan and Alberta) have 
pioneered this development, but hybrid models also exist in Scandinavia and Japan.44 The 
Irish Bill also contains provisions for co-decision-making45 and the Victorian Law Reform 
Commission in Australia has also recommended such a model.46  
Unlike supported decision-making agreements, co-decision-making arrangements 
tend to be put in place by courts, rather than by the adult.47 However, often the consent 
of the adult is specifically required.48  In most jurisdictions, the court, in appointing a co-
decision-maker, must consider factors similar to those that need to be taken into account 
when a guardian or administrator is appointed: i.e. whether there is a need for the 
appointment, whether it is in the best interest of the adult, whether there are any less 
restrictive options available and, uniquely, whether the adult’s capacity is impaired but he 
or she could make decisions if given the support of a co-decision-maker.49 The necessity 
for court involvement also means that the court has a role in determining the suitability of 
the proposed co-decision-maker.50  
While the decision-making process in this model is considered a shared one, some 
legislation – like that in Saskatchewan – deems the decision itself to be the adult’s.51 In 
contrast with the supported decision-making regime, it appears that the co-decision-
maker’s involvement is considered mandatory (at least in some circumstances).  This 
makes sense if the underlying rationale is that the adult lacks capacity without the 
involvement of the co-decision-maker for certain decisions.  However, the existing 
legislation in the Canadian jurisdictions makes the co-decision-maker’s involvement 
implicit, through making contracts voidable without the signature of both the adult and 
                                                 
43 Then (n 2) at 133,151  
44 S Danielsen, “Guardianship, the Danish Approach” in K Blankman (ed), International IGN Conference on 
Guardianship - Conference Book (2008) 79–80; M Arai, “Japan’s new safety net: reform of statutory 
guardianships and the creation of voluntary guardianships” (2000) 13 National Association of Elder Law 
Attorneys Quarterly 1; I Doron, “Elder guardianship kaleidoscope – a comparative perspective” (2002) 16 IJLPF 
368. 
45 See Assisted Decision-Making (Capacity) Bill 2013 (Ireland) available at 
http://www.justice.ie/en/JELR/Assisted%20Decision-
making%20(Capacity)%20Bill%202013.pdf/Files/Assisted%20Decision-making%20(Capacity)%20Bill%202013.pdf 
46 Victorian Law Reform Commission (Australia), Guardianship Final Report, Report No 24 (2012) ch 9. 
 47 See, for example, Adult Guardianship and Trusteeship Act, A 2008, c A-4.2, s 13; The Adult Guardianship 
and Co-decision-making Act, S 2000, c A-5.3, s 14(1)(a); Civil Code of Quebec, Q 1991, c 64, 291.   
48 See, for example, Adult Guardianship and Trusteeship Act, A 2008, c A-4.2, ss 13(4)(c), 17(8).  
49 See, for example, The Adult Guardianship and Co-decision-making Act, S 2000, c A-5.3, ss 14, 40; Adult 
Guardianship and Trusteeship Act, A 2008, c A-4.2, s 13(4)(a).   
50 See, for example, The Adult Guardianship and Co-decision-making Act, S 2000, c A-5.3, ss 13(1)(e), 14(3)(b), 
39(1)(f), 40(3)(b); Adult Guardianship and Trusteeship Act, A 2008, c A-4.2, 14(1).  
51 The Adult Guardianship and Co-decision-making Act, S 2000, c A-5.3, ss 23(1), 48(1).   
  
the co-decision-maker.52 The Victorian Law Reform Commission recommends that the need 
for the co-decision-maker’s involvement be made explicit.53 
As with supporters, co-decision-makers have rights of access to information to assist 
them in their role but also tend to have more explicit duties.54 Co-decision-makers who 
act in good faith are generally excluded from liability.55 Such a model of ‘joint’ decision-
making is clearly innovative, introducing a new legal concept to guardianship laws which 
has little precedence.   
d) Concerns arising from supported and co-decision-making models 
Little is known about how these two models work in practice, and there are a number of 
legal and practical concerns with these two models - particularly with co-decision-
making.56  As noted by one of the authors elsewhere, questions arise regarding how such 
regimes would mesh with existing laws (e.g. succession law, consent to medical treatment 
etc), how liability should be apportioned under a supported or co-decision-making model, 
whether such relationships are fiduciary in nature and what form legal safeguards – to 
protect the adult from undue influence, coercion and abuse – should take. 57 There is also 
the issue of the effective and fair resolution of disputes between adults with reduced 
capacity and their supporters or co-decision-makers, and  the question of who should act 
when the adult has no one within their social network to take on such an important role.58  
Additionally, it is debatable whether adding another layer of legal regulation is to 
an already complex guardianship law regime would be beneficial. Those who planned to 
take on the role of supporters and co-decision-makers would require education in their 
new roles and the reforms would need to be publicised within the wider community.59    
We turn now to consider whether, and in what way, assisted decision-making is 
recognised in Scottish legislation.  While there has not been any explicit introduction of 
formal supported and co-decision-making models, reforms in other areas may, in practice, 
have similar effects. These developments merit consideration and highlight the need for 
more debate about the direction of incapacity legislation in Scotland. 
C. PART 3. ASSISTED DECISION-MAKING IN THE SCOTTISH CONTEXT 
As discussed above, the Adults with Incapacity (Scotland) Act 2000) does not take any 
explicit steps to give legal effect to the concept of assisted decision-making. Like many 
other jurisdictions, though, its general principles are consistent with the concept of 
assisted decision-making. Beyond this, the Scottish legislation does little more.   
However, the concept of assisted decision-making has some currency in Scotland; the 
law relating to mental health (under the Mental Health (Care and Treatment) (Scotland) 
Act 2003) and the recent Self Directed Support Act 2013 both contain elements which 
                                                 
52 See for example, The Adult Guardianship and Co-decision-making Act, S 2000, c A-5.3, ss 16, 17(2), 41, 
42(2); Adult Guardianship and Trusteeship Act, A 2008, c A-4.2, 17(5).  
53 Victorian Law Reform Commission (Australia), Guardianship Final Report, Report No 24 (2012) para 9.86.  
54  See for example, Adult Guardianship and Trusteeship Act, A 2008, c A-4., ss 18(1), 22; The Adult 
Guardianship and Co-decision-making Act, S 2000, c A-5.3, ss 25, 50.  
55 See for example, Adult Guardianship and Trusteeship Act, A 2008, c A-4.2, s 23; The Adult Guardianship and 
Co-decision-making Act, S 2000, c A-5.3, s 70.  
56 See generally Then (n 2) at 133, pt IV.  
57 Then (n 2) at 133, 157-62. 
58 Then (n 2) at 133, 165-6. 
59 Then (n 2) at 133, 162-5.  
  
have, at their core, the aim  of assisting adults who might otherwise have difficulties in 
decision-making. 
1. INDEPENDENT ADVOCACY AND ASSISTED DECISION-MAKING 
In this section we look at the way in Scottish mental health legislation, through its 
creation of rights to independent advocacy, recognises the need to support individuals 
living with mental disorders to make their own decisions, where possible. This legislation 
applies not just to people liable to compulsory measures under that Act, but also to adults 
whose mental impairments may mean that they become liable to measures under  
incapacity  legislation.  
Advocacy is a seen as a way of helping people express their own wishes and needs 
and make their own decisions. Advocacy workers can help people speak up for themselves 
or can speak on their behalf if necessary.  
Advocacy …..empowers people who need a stronger voice by helping them to 
express their own needs and make their own decisions; enables people to gain 
access to information, explore and understand their options and to make their 
views and wishes known.60 
Scottish mental health legislation defines advocacy services as services of support 
and representation which enable people to have as much control or influence over their 
care and welfare as appropriate.61  
Most advocacy workers work with individual clients, but there are also collective, 
group, advocacy projects, such as patients’ councils and user groups and forums. Advocacy 
can assist people in hospital and those living in the community. Most parts of Scotland now 
have some form of individual advocacy for people with mental disorders and several have 
collective advocacy. A different form of advocacy (known as ‘non-instructed advocacy’) 
can also be utilised where an individual lacks the legal capacity to appoint an advocate. 
a) Legal right to advocacy 
Everyone in Scotland who has a mental illness, learning disability or personality disorder 
has the legal right of access to independent advocacy.62 This includes people subject to 
compulsory measures and informal patients, and applies whether people are living in 
hospital or in the community.  
Health boards and local authorities are given the legal duty to co-operate to ensure 
that independent advocacy services are available in their area and to ensure that people 
have the right to access independent advocacy services.63  
This general duty is supplemented by specific duties to advise patients of their 
right to advocacy and assist them to access services at key stages of the compulsion 
process.64  
The Act does not further regulate advocacy workers and no legal formalities are 
required to appoint an advocacy worker. Standards are a matter for the advocacy projects 
                                                 
60 The Scottish Independent Advocacy Alliance, Independent Advocacy: a guide for commissioners (2010) 4. 
61 Mental Health (Care and Treatment) (Scotland) Act 2003 s 259(4).  
62 Mental Health (Care and Treatment) (Scotland) Act 2003 s 259(1).  
63 Mental Health (Care and Treatment) (Scotland) Act 2003 ss 259(2) and (7).  
64 See, for example, Mental Health (Care and Treatment) (Scotland) Act 2003 ss 45(1), 61(2), 85(2), 89(2), 
94(4C), 151(2), 155(2), 159(4C).  
  
themselves, and the Scottish Independent Advocacy Alliance maintains a set of Principles 
and Standards and a Code of Practice.65 
b) Advocacy and decision making 
An advocate can assist a person in making a decision but should not unduly influence him 
or her. 
An effective advocate will ensure the person has all the relevant information they 
need, including options they might not have thought of themselves. Together with 
their advocacy partner [the service user], the advocate will explore options and 
ensure that their advocacy partner understands their options and rights as well as 
possible outcomes and consequences.  
Advocates speak on behalf of persons who have difficulty speaking for themselves, 
or choose not to do so. Advocacy is about broadening horizons and widening the 
options that people have by giving information.66 
The use of an advocate may, therefore, mean that a person is able to communicate 
his or her wishes or take a decision which might otherwise have been too complex for the 
individual. In this way the Scottish emphasis on rights to independent advocacy can be 
seen as recognition of the need for assisted decision-making.  
However, while people with mental disorders leading to incapacity will have the 
legal right to an independent advocate under mental health legislation, the Adults with 
Incapacity (Scotland) Act 2000 does not give a similar right to people whose 
communication difficulties might impair their decision-making. Moreover the formal 
procedures of the Adults with Incapacity (Scotland) Act 2000 have not been modified to 
include a requirement that the adult should have had access to independent advocacy – 
although it is arguable that there would be people who would benefit from such 
involvement.  
In addition, and, we would argue, significantly, there is nothing in the 2000 Act to 
require that those considering a person’s capacity (or lack of it) to take decisions should 
first formally consider the person’s need for advocacy services or for other forms of 
assisted decision-making.67 Apart from the general principles (discussed above), there is 
no formal requirement that those considering use of guardianship legislation should first 
establish whether the person would be able to take the decision in question with 
appropriate help.  
2. THE SELF DIRECTED SUPPORT (SCOTLAND) ACT 2013 AND ASSISTED-DECISION-MAKING 
The Self Directed Support (Scotland) Act 2013 was introduced to give more choice to 
service users over how they receive community care services. In basic terms, when 
                                                 
65 Scottish Independent Advocacy Alliance, Edinburgh, “Principles and standards for independent advocacy” 
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someone is assessed as needing a service they now have more choice about how much 
involvement they want to have in how that service is delivered.68 
  The individual could already elect either to take a direct payment (cash sum) and 
arrange their own service or to allow the local authority to arrange the service for them. 
The legislation introduced the option of having an individual service fund where the cash 
payment is administered by the local authority or a third party but the individual can 
choose how it is spent. This option is likely to appeal to those who want more control 
without the additional responsibility of administering money themselves, keeping 
accounts, employing staff etc. It is also open to individuals to decide to use different 
options for different types of service.  (For example, to continue with the local authority 
arranging a day service but to receive a direct payment for respite care.) 
This Act contains provisions that appear to implement assisted decision-making to 
some extent. As with the guardianship regimes mentioned above, this Act has a statutory 
principled based approach with general principles set out in Section 1.  These include the 
following principles: 
A person must be provided with any assistance that is reasonably required to 
enable the person 
a) to express any views the person may have about the options for self directed 
support; and 
b) to make an informed choice when choosing an option for self directed support.69 
The notion of assistance to make an informed choice is taken further in Section 6. 
This introduces a new legal duty on local authorities in circumstances where someone with 
a mental disorder, who does not have a guardian or attorney, would benefit from 
assistance from another person to make a decision about services. In such cases, the local 
authority is now under a duty to identify a person who can provide that assistance. (The 
legislation does not expressly mention capacity and further regulations and guidance are 
awaited.) 
The new duty raises a number of issues for local authorities and those receiving 
community care services.  For example, it is not yet clear whether the person appointed 
will be a family member or friend or someone acting in a professional capacity, such as an 
independent advocate as mentioned above. Indeed, practice might be different within 
different local authority areas. Also, the legislation could be interpreted to mean that 
some adults who otherwise lack capacity can make valid decisions if given appropriate 
assistance by a third party.  If this is the case, it could represent a new form of decision-
making that resembles the assisted decision-making model more closely than the 
appointment of a substitute decision-maker under the guardianship model.    
CONCLUSION  
The Adults with Incapacity (Scotland) Act 2000 was seen as a forward thinking and person 
centred law when it was passed. Certainly, in Scotland the introduction of a principled 
based approach was a novel one which has been followed in subsequent legislation (for 
example the Adult Support and Protection (Scotland) Act 2007 and the Self Directed 
Support (Scotland) Act 2013). However, the concept of guardianship is still based on the 
more traditional model of appointing a substitute decision maker. For some individuals 
there will be no option but to continue with this approach.  
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 However, as we have seen, some jurisdictions are piloting more innovative 
approaches to capacity and decision-making and developing new legal ways to support 
that group of people who may have a level of impairment that makes them more 
vulnerable but who remain potentially able to make decisions with support using methods 
that fall short of guardianship.  Such reform is consistent with the human rights agenda 
outlined in the UN CRPD and these developments have been subject to increasing interest 
from legislatures around the world.  
 We have seen that the Adults with Incapacity (Scotland) Act recognises the concept 
of assisted decision making only implicitly. It does not formally require those making 
decisions about a person's capacity to consider whether the person could retain capacity if 
assistance were given to him or her to take decisions, and it does not require access to 
advocacy to be made available to the person at any stage of the process. 
 At the very least, consideration should be given to redressing these shortcomings – 
perhaps by inserting into Scottish legislation a principle similar to that set out in s1(3) of 
the Mental Capacity Act 2005, that a person should not be treated as unable to make a 
decision unless all practicable steps to help him or her to do so have been taken without 
success. In addition, enhanced good practice guidance could stress the importance of 
those involved in making guardianship applications considering, and reporting on, what 
assistance might be available to support the person to take decisions.  
 With the proper integration of the right to independent advocacy within the Adults 
with Incapacity Act in Scotland, it might be less likely that legislation would be required 
to implement a new form of assisted decision-making regime. As well as the already 
identified problems with such regimes, in Scotland, considerable resources, and 
considerable political will, have been invested in the development of independent 
advocacy. A new breed of 'decision making supporters' might be seen as adding an 
unwelcome new layer of complexity or bureaucracy.  
 However, the way adults with incapacities or impairments receive support in 
Scotland has changed significantly since the 2000 Act was conceived, with more and more 
people being supported in their own homes, and the expectation they will have a wider 
say in the support they receive. In light of these changes, it is, perhaps, time for a wider 
discussion about the current system and what we can learn from international models to 
make sure that Scottish incapacity legislation continues to be fit for purpose.   
